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Charles Koch’s scholarship was very much about the need to dig deeper into the
nature of public administration,1 and in the spirit of his work, this Article considers the
complex role that expertise plays in the Chevron doctrine. A guiding logic of that
doctrine is an agency confronts a policy issue as to how to interpret a statute when
“Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” and/or “the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”2 Scholars and lawyers under-
stand Chevron as establishing a deferential scope of review for an agency’s resolution
of a policy issue because, as compared to the federal courts, the agency has greater ex-
pertise and political accountability.3 Yet, while expertise is one of the reasons for defer-
ring to an agency’s statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court did not explain what is
meant by its reference to expertise,4 and, while scholars5 and courts6 continue to refer
to the need to defer to expertise, there has been little extended discussion by them about
what exactly “expertise” entails.7
In this Article, we show that digging deeper into the Chevron doctrine and its appli-
cation reveals the theories of expert public administration that lie behind application of
the doctrine. Expertise is central to the deference required by Chevron because an
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1 See, e.g., Charles Koch, An Extended Hypothetical for Teaching Administrative Law,
38 BRANDEIS L.J. 313 (2000); Charles Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 469–71 (1986); Charles Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative
Policy Making, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375 (2002).
2 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
3 Id. at 866.
4 See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
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understanding of what expert public administration entails, and how it operates is fun-
damental to understanding what type of power an administrative agency has to interpret
a statute. The problem is, however, that scholars have not paid enough attention to the-
ories of expert public administration and how they might justify and shape deference.
In light of long-existing concerns about how to reconcile public administration with lib-
eral theories of constitutional democracy, however, a more robust discourse about def-
erence and its relationship to theories of expert public administration is essential.
This Article is part of an ongoing project by the authors, together, separately, and
with others,8 that contends the coherence and effectiveness of the administrative process
suffer from the failure to understand the multifaceted nature of expertise and expert
public administration. Part I provides an overview of Chevron and the role that the con-
cept of expertise figured in the judgment. We show that, despite the fact that the treat-
ment of expertise is quite thin in Chevron, it has largely been understood as requiring
deference to expertise. Nevertheless, the concept of expertise is largely understood in
relative terms in that expertise has been understood as meaning that administrators are
more familiar with the issues and record than judges.9
Part II shows that expertise is more than just a relative concept and that an under-
standing of any particular type of expertise requires not only an understanding of the
types of expertise, but also the normative contexts used to understand and evaluate
expertise.10 Indeed, most arguments made for expertise in the administrative law con-
text are really arguments for expert public administration. Across the history of the
United States’ administrative state, two different paradigms of expert public adminis-
tration can be seen to have operated; the rational-instrumental (RI) and deliberative-
constitutive (DC) paradigms.11 These two paradigms conceptualize expertise and
accountability differently because each is based on a different institutional perspective
of behavior within public administration. An “enlightened” administrative law would
reflect both perspectives because there is considerable empirical evidence that both are
valid to a degree. The problem at present is that the RI paradigm dominates, which re-
sults in a range of problems.12 Specifically, in relation to Chevron, it results in a failure
to see that the doctrine can operate on both an RI and DC basis. It also results in a
8 See ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
4 (2007); Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government Works:
The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis]; Sidney Shapiro,
Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside
the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2012); Sidney A. Shapiro
& Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law
Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 577–78 (2011).
9 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
11 FISHER, supra note 8, at 28–32.
12 Id. at 32, 34.
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problematic legal fiction—that statutory ambiguity becomes a reason for deference
rather than grounding deference in a more robust understanding of the accountability
of expert public administration.
Part III considers how variations in the application of the Chevron doctrine in dif-
ferent judgments can largely be seen as determined by whether the RI or DC paradigm
is applied. We study Chevron itself, the litigation that resulted in the Supreme Court
decision of FDA v. Brown and Williamson Corp.,13 and the Supreme Court’s recent
case of City of Arlington v. FCC.14
We conclude that the failure to account for both the RI and DC paradigms explains
much of the variation in how the Chevron doctrine is applied. This insight not only
helps explain confusion in the application of Chevron, it allows us to see that recogni-
tion of a more varied and nuanced understanding of expert public administration would
lead to a more enlightened justification for judicial deference concerning agency stat-
utory interpretations.
Before starting, we should make it clear that, while we do think scholars need to
dig deeper into the Chevron doctrine, we also do think there is a body of very high qual-
ity scholarship focusing on Chevron. Likewise, we do recognize that we are not the
only ones to discuss expertise and public administration,15 but our point is that, by and
large, there has been relatively little focused, nuanced, and sustained attention paid
to the interrelationship between administrative law doctrine and theories of expert
public administration.
I. CHEVRON AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE
Since Justice Stevens’s judgment in 1984, the Chevron doctrine has become a
defining doctrine of contemporary administrative law.16 There is a revealing paradox
in its defining status. On the one hand, the two-step doctrine, with its focus on legisla-
tive text, is appealing in its simplicity and the perception that it provides a “clear rule.”17
13 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
14 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
15 See, e.g., Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 354–55 (2013);
Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756–57 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2116 (1990); Daniel E. Walters,
Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against Political Control,
28 J.L. & POL. 129, 130–31, 154–55 (2013).
16 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
833 (2001); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302 (1988); Sunstein, supra
note 15, at 2074–75.
17 Jonathan D. Urick, Chevron and Constitutional Doubt, 99 VA. L. REV. 375, 381 (2013).
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On the other hand, scholars have “leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries
of the Chevron approach.”18 We do not attempt to tackle the Chevron doctrine writ
large—our initial analysis is restricted to one aspect of the second step of the Chevron
doctrine—the reliance on “expertise” as a reason to defer to an agency interpretation.19
As will become clear in Part III, however, this second step cannot be considered with-
out regard to the first step.
In focusing on the role of expertise in the second step, we are acutely aware of two
things. First, expertise is not the only factor creating the need to defer in the second step
of the Chevron doctrine. Other factors, including concepts of delegated authority,20
presidential control,21 and the policy nature of the decision,22 can also be identified as
relevant to the second step. These other factors do not detract from our analysis—rather
they bolster it because, as we shall show, it is important not to think about expertise in
a vacuum. Second, deference is a concept that has proved particularly problematic in
the operation of the Chevron doctrine. Strauss has described it as “a highly variable, if
not empty, concept,”23 and Justice Scalia has noted deference is a “mealy-mouthed
word”24 that is often honored in the breach. While we have no doubt about the “highly
variable”25 nature of deference, this does not mean it should be understood as empty—
as we shall show, behind every theory of deference must be a theory of expert public
administration. Stating this is getting ahead of ourselves, however. Before addressing
this point, we need to return to an analysis of the Chevron judgment itself.
Chevron arose from a conflict focused on the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) interpretation (as set out in delegated legislation) of “stationary source” as it
related to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments.26 Under the 1977 Act, a permit was
required from a state regulator in states that had not attained air quality standards under
previous legislation before the construction of any “new or modified stationary sources”
of pollution.27 The effect of the EPA’s interpretation was to treat all emissions from a
18 Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 551, 553 (2012) (noting Chevron
has been cited in over 8,009 articles).
19 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
20 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984);
see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 735–56 (2002) (“[A]n implied
delegation of lawmaking power, rather than agency expertise, compelled the result.”).
21 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control,
Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1765–66 (2012).
22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–65.
23 Strauss, supra note 18, at 1145.
24 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 514.
25 Strauss, supra note 18, at 1145.
26 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841–42.
27 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2006).
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single plant as amounting to a single “bubble” and thus a single “stationary source.”28
This permitted a plant to modify or install a piece of equipment that emitted pollution
if the total pollution emissions from the plant (i.e., the bubble) did not change.29
This conflict is related to a broader set of developments in public administration in
the United States. The EPA, set up by Executive Order in 1970, was one of a number
of new administrative agencies created in an era of social reform.30 The structure of
these agencies differed significantly, but all were understood as departures from a New
Deal model of public administration.31 In being so, they combined expertise and partici-
patory processes in the pursuit of ambitious social goals.32 The Clean Air Act of 1970
was in itself an “environmental superstatute,”33 but by the early 1980s, it, and its amend-
ment in 1977, were subject to considerable criticism, focused particularly on the respec-
tive abilities of legislatures and expert administrative agencies to deliver environmental
protection.34 The application by the EPA of its interpretation of “stationary source” to
nonattainment states was part of the more “flexible” approach to regulation taken by
the Reagan administration.35 The conflict over the interpretation of this term was thus
embedded in a deeper debate about the nature of the EPA’s authority in this area.36
That deeper narrative has tended to be overlooked, putting the focus on the
Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine. The Court of Appeals, which can be understood
as following a purpose approach to the 1977 amendments,37 held that the EPA had to
ensure that a plant could not modify or install a piece of equipment that emitted pol-
lution without first obtaining a permit.38 In contrast, Justice Stevens, delivering a
judgment for the Supreme Court, described the process of reviewing an “agency’s con-
struction” of a statute as involving two questions39:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
29 Id.
30 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 26–28 (1990).
31 Id. at 29; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2082.
32 FISHER, supra note 8, at 98.
33 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 276 (2010).
34 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE
CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRO-
DUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 2–3 (1981); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes
or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 750–51 (1983).
35 KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 161–62 (2013).
36 Id. at 163; BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 173 (1996).
37 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841–42 (1984).
38 Id. at 857.
39 Id. at 842.
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the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the pre-
cise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.40
This declaratory statement was made at the point in the opinion in which Justice
Stevens began to justify the decision, and it transformed an institutional issue into a
doctrinal test focused on the text of a statute. The institutional issue was whether the
EPA should have the authority to override what appeared to be a congressional inten-
tion to speed up the clean-up of nonattainment areas.41 The court of appeals, using its
purpose approach, had sought to give effect to this intent.42
Justice Stevens followed up the statement above with references to the way in
which agencies filled the “gap[s]” left by Congress,43 and the “considerable weight” to
be given to “an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer.”44 “In light of these well-settled principles,” he concluded that the
court of appeals had “misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing” the EPA
regulations.45 As such, the Court held that the EPA’s interpretation was a permissi-
ble construction.46
Justice Stevens then spent the bulk of his judgment focusing on the legislative his-
tory of the Clean Air Act and its 1977 amendment. He described the 1977 amendment
as “a lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major
social issue.”47 He also made clear that there was no “specific comment on the bubble
concept” in the legislative history of the 1977 amendments dealing with nonattainment
areas.48 After also recounting the history of the EPA’s interpretation of source and the
petitioners’ arguments, Justice Stevens noted: “Our review of the EPA’s varying inter-
pretations of the word ‘source’ . . . convinces us that the agency primarily responsible
40 Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
41 Id. at 843–44.
42 Id. at 840.
43 Id. at 843–44.
44 Id. at 844.
45 Id. at 845.
46 Id. at 866.
47 Id. at 848.
48 Id. at 851.
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for administering this important legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly—not
in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a
technical and complex arena.”49 It was only towards the end of his judgment and under
the subheading “policy” that Justice Stevens expanded upon the issue of deference. He
gave a range of reasons for deferring to the agency’s interpretation including “the regu-
latory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed
and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”50
He then made two references to expertise. Justice Stevens first noted that “perhaps”
Congress had not spoken precisely to the question at issue “thinking that those with
great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the [statute] would
be in a better position” to choose an appropriate policy.51 And he noted, “[j]udges are
not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.”52
This is the sum total of the treatment of expertise in Chevron.
By comparison, the Court elaborated at some length on why deference was appro-
priate in light of the agency’s political accountability. Courts “in some cases . . . recon-
cile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences.”53 By comparison, an agency within the limits of a congressional delega-
tion may “properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s view of wise policy to
inform its judgments.”54 And, although “agencies are not directly accountable to the
people,” the President is and it is therefore “entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”55 “When a challenge to an
agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on
the wisdom of the agency’s policy,” the Court went on, “federal judges—who have
no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do.”56 In other words, “[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are
not judicial ones.”57 Deference to expertise was thus being seen in the context of presi-
dential control.58
We will return to this point59 and the judgment below. What is clear here, however,
is that the judgment contains very little discussion of the concept of expertise and in
particular the nature of the agency’s expertise. Thus, there is discussion of judges not
49 Id. at 863.
50 Id. at 864–65 (footnotes omitted).





56 Id. at 866.
57 Id.
58 Meazell, supra note 21, at 1775.
59 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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being experts,60 the wisdom of specific interpretations or choices,61 and Congress dele-
gating expertise,62 but even in the discussion of legislative history, there is little elabora-
tion of the agency’s expertise.
The concept of deference to agency expertise was of course not new to judicial
doctrine concerning statutory interpretation, but Chevron was understood to be a refor-
mulation of the judiciary’s role.63 In being so, the concept of expertise is understood as
comparative in nature.64 Sunstein, writing in 1990, put the point like this: “For the first
question [the first Chevron step], strictly legal expertise seems relevant. For the latter
question [the second Chevron step], it is the agency that has a comparative advan-
tage.”65 Deference to expertise is thus largely understood as operating when the courts’
expertise runs out.
II. GETTING TO GRIPS WITH EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Despite the lack of discussion of expertise in Chevron, case law66 and scholarship67
both understand the second step in Chevron requires involving some deference to ad-
ministrative expertise, although some scholars do note that both the nature of deference
and expertise are distinct from that of other previous case law.68
At this point, it is therefore important to understand why an understanding of the
nature and complexities of expertise and expert public administration are so fundamen-
tal for administrative law scholars to have. At the very least the existence of expertise
60 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
61 Id. at 863–64, 866.
62 Id. at 865.
63 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
64 Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2193 (2011); see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reason-
ableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 848, (2010); Kevin M. Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 408 (2012).
65 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2095.
66 See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring); Mayo Found. v. United States, 562 U.S. 713 (2011); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
556 U.S. 208, 235 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009);
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X,
545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 703 (1995).
67 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2005);
David M. Gossett, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 688–90 (1997); Meazell, supra note 21, at 1775; Deborah Pearlstein,
Justice Stevens and the Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1302 (2011); Stack, supra note 64,
at 408.
68 Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 89
MICH. ST. L. REV. 120 (2009).
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as a factor in the Chevron doctrine highlights its importance. “[A]gency ‘expertise’ may
be a source of innocent merriment in academic analysis of agency-court relations,”69 but
it is also part of the reality of those relations. If we are to engage with that reality, it is
necessary to understand the complex and normative nature of expertise, and more im-
portantly for administrative law, to understand expert public administration. Specifi-
cally, expertise has many facets besides the “comparative” expertise noted in Chevron.
A. The Types of Expertise
A need for expertise has long been recognized and accepted as one of the justifica-
tions for the growth of the administrative state.70 Yet, while that need has been grudg-
ingly accepted, it is generally not appreciated that expertise has multiple dimensions,
which means that there is no definitive definition of expertise. Expertise and expert
knowledge may take very different institutional and substantive forms, and have dif-
ferent purposes.
Skills, knowledge, and experience may be both explicit (explainable) and tacit (dif-
ficult to explain; intuitive).71 Thus, explicit knowledge can be obtained from a set of
explicit techniques (i.e., manuals and procedures), while implicit knowledge is gained
from observation and expertise (i.e., professional practices). For example, while one can
read about how to become a lawyer, there is a limit to which that knowledge can be ex-
plained in a manner that produces expertise.72
It is also useful to distinguish between those bodies of expertise that may be under-
stood as contributing to the further advancement of a particular area of knowledge (con-
tributory expertise) or may be simply the expertise in knowing about another area of
knowledge, but not actually participating in its creation (interactional expertise).73 Thus,
for example, lawyers and legal scholars are contributory experts in relation to law, but
to be so they must be interactional experts in terms of understanding other disciplines
which law interacts with, and the problems to which it applies. It is also the case that
many disciplines consist of contributory experts who work in many small areas, but
whose interactional expertise allows them to interact with one another.74
All of the above means that an argument for a need for expertise in government
may be an argument for many different things. The problem is that a comparative
69 Stephen F. Williams, The Roots of Deference, 100 YALE L.J. 1103, 1105 (1991).
70 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS GOVERNMENT 139 (1930) (explaining that educa-
tion is the key to democratic government); William J. Butler, The Rising Tide of Expertise, 15
FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 23–25 (1946); see also Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L REV. 1276, 1282–83 (1984).
71 HARRY COLLINS, TACIT AND EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE 4 (2010).
72 See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 52–53 (1988).
73 See Harry Collins, Language and Practice, 41 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 271, 274 (2011); see
also HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 2 (2007).
74 Collins, supra note 73, at 274.
474 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:465
definition of expertise does not enlighten us very much about what those different
things might be. This is best illustrated by an example taken from a more domestic con-
text. Fisher’s sons are “experts” in Star Wars, as compared to her, because of their
repeated watching of the films and because they like to “play” Star Wars.75 She is more
of an expert than them in scholarly legal analysis because of her formal training and
professional experience. These types of expertise are fundamentally different and their
operation will have different implications. A focus on comparative expertise (Star Wars
versus law) gives us very little insight into the implications of these different types of
comparative expertise and how they operate in practice. Thus, for example, these two
types of expertise are unlikely to interrelate. In contrast, Fisher will have comparatively
more experience than her sons about the long-term benefits of having enough sleep and
that will interrelate and trump their desire to “play” Star Wars deep into the night.
B. Institutional Contexts
The previous examples are of course in the domestic realm, but by stepping out
from that realm it can be seen that expertise and expert knowledge are normally orga-
nized through different institutional forms. These contexts establish the rules and
norms by which expertise is practiced. The institutional context regulates how expert
knowledge, skills, and experience are gained and utilized.76 Institutional contexts can
vary. Medieval guilds are a historical example,77 but more contemporary examples
include disciplines and professions.78
The institutional context has significant ramifications for the use of expertise, mak-
ing expertise more likely to accomplish an organization’s purpose in some situations
and less likely in others.79 The new institutionalism literature recognizes three perspec-
tives concerning the study of politics and government that offer an assessment of public
administration: rational choice, normative, and discursive institutionalism.80 The first
(rational choice) doubts the efficacy of expertise, while the others (normative and dis-
cursive) find that properly managed organizations can take advantage of expertise to
accomplish their ends.81
75 See Michelene T. H. Chi, Laboratory Methods for Assessing Experts’ and Novices’
Knowledge, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE (K.
Ericsson et al. eds., 2006).
76 See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CRAFTSMAN 46, 52 (2008); Shapiro, Missing Institutional
Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 10).
77 SENNETT, supra note 76, at 56–57.
78 See generally FRANK FISCHER, DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISE: REORIENTING POLICY
INQUIRY (2009); GOVERNMENT AND EXPERTISE: SPECIALISTS, ADMINISTRATORS AND PROFES-
SIONALS, 1860–1919 (Roy Macleod ed., 1988); JEROME KAGAN, THE THREE CULTURES:
NATURAL SCIENCES, SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND THE HUMANITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009)
(explaining how the various sciences are studied according to varying norms).
79 See generally Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 10, 16).
80 Id. (manuscript at 1).
81 Id.
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Rational choice institutionalism recognizes the familiar description of government
offered in public choice analysis that governmental employees will seek to advance
their own self-interest over the goals of the agency in which they work.82 This literature
also finds that government managers are less able to deter such behavior than their
private counterparts because they have less opportunity to rely on rewards and pun-
ishments, such as raises or dismissal.83 In light of these impediments, rational choice
institutionalism is skeptical that experts in the government will be reliable agents in
accomplishing the government’s ends.84
What this perspective misses is the proven potential of normative and deliberative
institutionalism to channel expertise into supporting an agency’s statutory mission.
Organizations can rely on a positive organizational culture—normative institution-
alism—to supplement the economic incentives that are the subject of rational choice
institutionalism.85 Most institutionalism, including government, relies on profession-
alism as one such form of norming. A government agency does this by establishing
an organizational culture that promotes the agency’s mission, a sense of public service,
and professionalism.86 The first two norms reinforce the other regarding motives of
civil servants. The last norm—professionalism—promotes accountability by promot-
ing neutral expertise, in which experts in the agency used their expertise according to
their professional training.
Most experts are trained and operate as professionals, a situation that marries exper-
tise and reliability. Professionals have been trained and socialized to interpret informa-
tion according to the standards of their profession,87 which includes discouraging the
82 As a result, employees’ decisions will reflect their interest in promotion within the gov-
ernment or employment outside of it, the accumulation of power and influence, or such self-
interested goals as avoiding hard work (“shirking”) or seeking to prevent policies favored by
administrators, that they oppose (“sabotage”). Id. (manuscript at 4).
83 Id. (manuscript at 5).
Furthermore, this literature finds government managers lack the same eco-
nomic tools used by their private counterparts to counter self-interested
behavior. A private manager (the “principal”) will rely on contracting, fi-
nancial incentives, and monitoring the performance of an employee (the
“agent”) to align the employee’s interests with that of the company that
employs the person.
Id. (manuscript at 4).
84 Id. (manuscript at 4–5).
85 Guy Peters has explained, “Part of the argument for positing a normative basis for in-
stitutions is that in effective institutions the sanctioning and enforcement processes are built
into the structures themselves through socialization, rather than requiring an external enforce-
ment mechanism.” B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 38 (3d ed. 2012).
86 Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 6–7).
87 See HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING & MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 304–05
(4th ed. 2009) (describing that hallmarks of professionalism include a “code of conduct and
emphasis on adherence to it” and a “feeling of ethical obligation to render service to clients
without self-interest and with emotional neutrality”); see also id. at 305–06 (explaining that
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presentation of information in a manner that serves the professional’s self-interest.88
Professional norms influence lawyers, to take but one example, to inform their client
impartially about the client’s options, and then to implement the decision of the client,
even if they disagree with it.89 Scientists, to take another example, are trained to under-
take, read, and interpret scientific evidence in an impartial manner. Peer expectations
within the professional communities reinforce these traits.90
While choices and decisions are influenced by institutional norms and values, the
obligation to act professionally does not eliminate the use of judgment by a profes-
sional.91 Nevertheless, this discretion does not become a license for experts to follow
their self-interest. The reason is that government, like other institutions, relies on dis-
cursive institutionalism to channel and guide behavior when individual judgments are
necessary.92 Discursive institutionalism refers to the discourse that requires experts to
communicate and defend their ideas and concepts.93 The deliberation and reason-giving
debates and vets the choices available to experts within the context of their professional
commitments to view and interpret evidence and arguments.94
What this means is the institutional context, inside and outside of an organization,
impacts the use of expertise by the organization. Expertise is thus not operating in a
vacuum—it has an institutional life and different institutional cultures construct dif-
ferent concepts and ideals of expertise.95 We can not discuss expertise as a concept
without discussing the context in which it is operating.
C. Accountability Paradigms
What the analysis above highlights is that discussions about expertise also have a
normative dimension. These normative ideals are not operating in isolation. They are
professionals in the Reagan administration disagreed with many of its policies but regarded it
as their professional obligation to discharge those policies effectively).
88 See id. at 305. See generally MICHÈLE LAMONT, HOW PROFESSORS THINK: INSIDE THE
CURIOUS WORLD OF ACADEMIC JUDGMENT (2009) (highlighting the role of expertise, prep-
aration, discourse, and socialization in interdisciplinary academic funding papers in the
United States).
89 Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of
Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 277–78 (2009).
90 See SENNETT, supra note 76, at 246–49 (furnishing examples of socialized expertise and
dialogical cooperation in the professions). See generally RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE
RITUALS, PLEASURES AND POLITICS OF COOPERATION (2012).
91 See PETERS, supra note 85, at 40.
92 Id. at 112 (noting that discursive institutionalism understands an organization as being
composed of ideas and the manner in which those ideas are communicated within the institution,
that is, based on “shared communication”).
93 Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9–10).
94 Id. (manuscript at 11).
95 See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 117–18 (1988).
2013]   CHEVRON & THE LEGITIMACY OF “EXPERT” PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 477
“co-produced” with understandings of problems and institutions.96 Discussions about
expertise are nearly always tied to prescriptions about how institutions should change,
and it is hard to discuss what an expert is without veering into what one thinks an expert
should be.97 Moreover, normative prescriptions about expertise are driven by assump-
tions about how we should understand the role of institutions and the nature of particu-
lar problems. This means expertise is developed because of perceived institutional and
resource needs, and will naturally coexist alongside different types of institutions and
understandings of different types of problems. The need for expertise is therefore not
just a recognition that there is a need for skills, knowledge, or experience, but also that
there is a need for expertise to take a particular institutional form—expert public admin-
istration. There is, of course, no one fixed model of expert public administration, how-
ever. The history and current landscape of the administrative state in the United States
is evidence of that.98 Moreover, the issue of nature and role of public administration is
an inherently normative one. As Shapiro has pointed out, the quintessential issue for
administrative law scholarship is how to fit “the ‘round peg’ of administrative govern-
ment into the ‘square hole’ of the nation’s constitutional culture.”99 In particular, for
public administration to be made consistent with the constitutional prescriptions, it must
be connected to constitutional processes of legislation and executive power.
We have explained previously that two paradigms have been used in this country
to legitimize public administration—the rational-instrumental (RI) and deliberative-
constitutive (DC) paradigms of administrative constitutionalism.100 These models and
paradigms can be understood as paradigms of administrative constitutionalism in that
they are models of how public administration can be constituted to ensure its constitu-
tional legitimacy.101 Each embodies a different understanding of expertise and a dif-
ferent ideal of accountability.
1. The RI Paradigm
The RI paradigm seeks to limit the discretion of public administration, relying on
institutional arrangements that work from the outside of an agency, thereby producing
outside-in accountability.102 The goal of limiting discretion reflects rational choice
96 FISHER, supra note 8, at 27–28; Sheila Jasanoff, A New Climate for Society, 27 THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 233, 236, 249 (2010).
97 See, e.g., SENNETT, supra note 76, at 246–52 (discussing “sociable” and “isolated”
expertise).
98 David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611,
611–13 (2012); Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 471–76.
99 Sidney A. Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, 2005 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
1, 3.
100 FISHER, supra note 8, at 28–32.
101 See id. at 24–25.
102 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 467–68.
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institutionalism, which as noted, understands the motives of public officials to be self-
interested,103 and on this assumption, the paradigm distrusts public administration. The
RI paradigm therefore relies on three types of institutional arrangements to shrink
administrative discretion that operate from outside of the agency, producing outside-
in accountability.104
One set of institutional arrangements relies on legal frameworks of scientific and
social-scientific methodologies, such as cost-benefit analysis, which are intended to
“guide discretion and allow it to be easily assessed.”105 The idea is that to the extent
these methodologies provide objective evidence, they “will act as a constraint on ad-
ministrative discretion.”106 A second institution is the participation of interested parties
in interest-representation rulemaking. A pluralistic participatory process is understood
to reduce discretion by “gaining an account of the ‘will of the people,’” which makes
the role of the agency “simply to be an umpire overseeing the process.”107 In other
words, the interest group process identifies appropriate resolutions of the questions
presented, which has the effect of narrowing agency discretion to decide what type of
rule to adopt.
Finally, the RI paradigm employs political oversight and judicial review to police
the boundaries of agency discretion.108 Political oversight, as Chevron describes it,
reduces agency discretion by subjecting decisionmaking to the influence of elected
officials.109 Judicial review is a limit on agency discretion because it ensures agency
decisions are consistent with statutory commands, scientific and social scientific evi-
dence, and with comments filed by interested parties.110 At the same time, judicial re-
view permits the resolution of issues in response to political demands, as long as the
policy chosen can be defended as consistent with an agency’s statutory mandate and the
rulemaking record. In such a context, deference occurs if the statutory and methodologi-
cal framework allows it. What this means in practice, is that statutory ambiguity and/or
technical complexity111 are reasons to defer. The implications of this will be seen in the
next part.
2. The DC Paradigm
The starting point for the DC paradigm is the recognition in a democracy for the
need to have institutions that can address complex problems in a flexible and ongoing
103 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 467–68.
105 FISHER, supra note 8, at 28.
106 Id. Whether these methodologies can in fact produce objective evidence is highly con-
tested. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
107 FISHER, supra note 8, at 29.
108 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 468–69.
109 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
110 See generally Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8.
111 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy Wagner, Understanding Environmental Models
in Their Legal and Regulatory Context, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 251, 270–73 (2010).
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way. On this basis, the DC paradigm rejects the RI premise and grants to public admin-
istration substantial and ongoing problem-solving discretion. Under the DC paradigm,
legislation is understood to set out a series of general principles and parameters for the
exercise of discretion.112 This paradigm regards discretion as inevitable because it can-
not be eliminated by reliance on scientific and social-scientific methodologies,113 as the
first model aspires to do. Given this reality, it looks to normative and discursive insti-
tutionalism to deter self-interested behavior, thereby producing inside-out account-
ability.114 The capacity of agencies to assemble a diverse group of experts, to conduct
a discursive process, and to reach a decision that reflects this expertise is understood to
be one reason why Congress delegates discretion to agencies in the first place.
Specially, the DC paradigm relies on the normative influences mentioned earlier:
an organizational culture that promotes the agency’s mission, a sense of public services,
and professionalism. Discursive institutionalism is at work both within an agency (inter-
nal deliberations) and with interested outside parties (external deliberations).115 In the
DC paradigm, rulemaking is therefore understood, not as political pluralism in which
a deal is made, but a process of debate and vetting of evidence and ideas. Deliberation
is thus important for what it contributes to problem solving.116 Finally, legal procedures
require an agency to defend and rationalize its ideas, employing the reason-giving as-
pect of discursive institutionalism. When an agency uses these institutional arrange-
ments, they promote democratic legitimacy by ensuring that an agency accomplishes
the constitutive role that Congress delegated to the agency.117
3. The Two Paradigms Compared
As can be seen from above, each model promotes a very different model of expert
public administration and accountability. The RI paradigm understands expert public
administration as an institution that can apply its analytical expertise to any context due
to the fact that expert authority derives from methodology and not an understanding of
the problem.118 As authority derives from methodology, accountability can and should
112 FISHER, supra note 8, at 30.
113 The methodologies, particularly cost-benefit analysis, are not accurate, require policy
assumptions to work, and often can be manipulated on the basis of the analyst’s policy prefer-
ence. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 450–59 (2008). Further, claims that
rational choice methodologies are objective are simply untenable in light of postempiricism
revelations that the social sciences (as well as other forms of science) are at most a mixture of
empirical data and social construction. Id. at 459–62.
114 Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1).
115 Id. (manuscript at 10).
116 See generally Jenny Steele, Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law:
Exploring a Problem-Solving Approach, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 415 (2001).
117 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 469.
118 SENNETT, supra note 76, at 247 (explaining that experience and analytical skills matter).
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operate from the outside in, as the process of holding expert public administration to
account focuses upon how the methodology was applied. As this is the case, it is not
surprising that the raison d’être of the RI paradigm has been the promotion of analytical
methodologies such as risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis.119 The cost/benefit
administrative state is thus an RI administrative state.120
In contrast, the expertise of DC public administration is more “sociable” in nature
in that it is focused on developing good practice, judgment, and wisdom in addressing
problems.121 Part of that expertise is learning how to work within the limits of the tools
and processes available, particularly the limitations of scientific and economic meth-
odologies.122 A prime example of the promotion of DC expert public administration
can be seen in the National Research Council’s Understanding Risk report in which
they argued that risk characterization should be an “analytic-deliberative process.”123
Such a type of expertise develops its own internal norms and concepts of accountability,
thus, inside-out accountability.
The different types of accountability that the RI and DC paradigms promote can be
seen in the way that each paradigm serves as a basis for a different type of judicial re-
view doctrine.124 Thus under the RI paradigm, the role of courts in carrying out judicial
review is largely about policing legislative and methodological boundaries. Under the
DC paradigm, courts need to develop more nuanced doctrines and must assess the exer-
cise of discretion against more substantive criteria. The difference in approach is thus
not about intensity or deference but relates to the nature of the judicial inquiry. Exam-
ples of both RI and DC judicial-review doctrines can be seen historically,125 but it also
must be recognized that the development of DC doctrines raises the problem of “who
guards the guardians” as they require greater discretion on the part of courts in their
operation.126 What can be seen is that over time many doctrines, such as the “substantial
evidence” ground of review and “hard look” review, have been subject to both RI and
DC interpretations.127 As we shall see below, the same is true for the Chevron doctrine.
119 See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37
ENVTL. L. 1083 (2007).
120 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULA-
TORY PROTECTION (2002).
121 SENNETT, supra note 76, at 247–49.
122 See id. at 262; Fisher, Pascual & Wagner, supra note 111, at 272.
123 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY 2 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996).
124 For an elaboration see generally FISHER, supra note 8, at 89–124.
125 In the context of statutory interpretation, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944).
126 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIS-
TRATION (1988); see also James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law
and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 265, 282 (1979).
127 Compare United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1940) (DC interpretation), with Indust.
Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (RI interpretation). See
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The important point to note is that neither of these paradigms offers up a utopia and
each has its flaws.128 The RI paradigm focuses on control at the expense of fostering
effective public administration and the DC paradigm does vice versa. An explicit recog-
nition of the validity and role of both is, however, an important feature of an “enlight-
ened” administrative law.129
D. The Contemporary Malaise
The problem at present in contemporary, administrative law scholarship and doc-
trine is that the RI paradigm is dominating. We have written about this at length else-
where,130 but here we wish to note that it brings with it three very serious problems.
The first is that, as Richard Sennett has noted, types of expertise that are akin
to RI expertise are largely understood to operate separately from any context.131 This
can be seen in the way in which analytical methodologies such as risk assessment and
cost/benefit analysis are understood to displace other forms of decisionmaking.132 The
application of RI expertise is thus experienced as the trumping of authority for no rea-
son necessarily connected to the issue at stake, and this creates an “invidious com-
parison.”133 The “invidiousness” of the situation arises because it awakens resentment
in those who are trumped and makes those using such tools feel embattled. In such
circumstances, the debate fractures along a fault line between science and democracy,
and expertise is largely understood as trumping the democratic process. The science/
democracy dichotomy, however, is a false dichotomy because, as seen above, both the
RI and DC models of public administration encapsulate both scientific and demo-
cratic inputs.134
This is a problem in part because the promotion of RI expertise means that admin-
istrative law scholars generally distrust agency expertise, as it does seem to be a type
Elizabeth C. Fisher, The Risks of Quantifying Justice: The Use of the Substantial Evidence Test
in Judicial Review of OSHA Rule-Making, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: RISKS AND LEGAL
PROCESSES 293–311 (Robert Baldwin ed., 1997); Elizabeth Fisher, Risk, Expertise and Judicial
Review: Scope of Review and Decision-Making Under Scientific Uncertainty (1998) (unpub-
lished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford). On “hard look review” compare the opinions of
Judges Bazelon and Leventhal in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also
FISHER, supra note 8, at 89–124.
128 FISHER, supra note 8, at 32–35.
129 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 486.
130 Id. at 479; Shapiro & Wright, supra note 8, at 608–18. See generally Shapiro, Missing
Institutional Analysis, supra note 8.
131 SENNETT, supra note 76, at 249.
132 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4, 11 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost Benefit
State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 9–10 (1998).
133 SENNETT, supra note 76, at 249.
134 FISHER, supra note 8, at 11–13.
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of expertise at odds with democratic constitutionalism. The rise in popularity of presi-
dential administration, rather than expertise, as the justification for deference, reflects
this distrust. Moreover, the dominance of the RI paradigm leads to a lack of discussion
concerning the nature and legitimacy of the administrative state. Compared to the New
Deal era,135 our understandings of expert public administration, as expressed in doctrine
and scholarship, are impoverished. While Chevron “did speak explicitly about the role
of expertise and accountability in statutory interpretation,”136 the discussion was quite
limited as compared to the richer concepts of expert public administration that we just
explored. Moreover, although considerable ink has been spilt on Chevron, these bottles
have been emptied in a pursuit of, and when, each step applies and how the courts are
to resolve step one and step two issues. These aspects of the case have become the de-
fining features of Chevron.137 This is even when, as seen above, the case was embedded
in a deeper narrative about the power of expert public administration.
The failure to recognize both paradigms has also adversely affected public adminis-
tration because administrative law has developed in ways that unnecessarily weaken
inside-out accountability, as we have detailed previously.138 For example, the rise of
presidential administration has tended to displace and denigrate the role of expertise
in public administration.139 We would therefore prefer institutional arrangements that
optimize the mix of outside-in and inside-out accountability. Moreover, it is not uncom-
mon for those who promote a DC model of public administration to be understood as
challenging the system, rather than recognizing that the goal is to find the most appro-
priate combination of the DC and RI paradigms in making public administration dem-
ocratically accountable. Indeed, a striking feature of U.S. administrative law is its
polarized nature.140
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the dominance of the RI paradigm creates
blindspots and narrows our vision in that it becomes difficult to see that the legiti-
macy of public administration can be grounded and based on other understandings of
expert public administration. It is not just that we are not discussing models of expert
public administration, but we cannot even begin to figure out how to do so. Doctrine
and practice are constantly being viewed through an RI lens, making it increasingly
135 See generally Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurmond Arnold and the
Making of the Modern Administrative State, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 69–74 (2005).
136 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006).
137 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1258 (1997).
138 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 476–85; Shapiro & Wright, supra note 8, at
608–17; Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 2).
139 Shapiro, Missing Institutional Analysis, supra note 8 (manuscript at 12); Shapiro & Wright,
supra note 8, at 608–17.
140 Dhvani Mehta, ‘Balancing’ and ‘Absolutism’ in Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Clean
Water Act: The ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ in U.S. Environmental Law (2011) (unpublished M. Phil. in
Law thesis, University of Oxford) (manuscript at 12–14).
2013]   CHEVRON & THE LEGITIMACY OF “EXPERT” PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 483
difficult for lawyers, scholars, and judges to envisage other ways to constitute, limit,
and hold expert public administration to account—even when the history of U.S. ad-
ministrative law shows this is the case.141 This compares sharply to the situation in
other jurisdictions.142
III. THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE REVISITED
Despite the narrowing of scholarly vision, it is the case that theories of expert pub-
lic administration will shape the nature and scope of judicial review.143 This is because
such theories will directly influence how it is best understood to constitute, limit, and
hold a decisionmaker to account. We discussed this briefly above, but here we want to
undertake a more extended analysis to show how such theories influence how courts
approach questions of statutory interpretation. Whether the “intent of Congress” is clear
in a statute is going to be dependent on what is understood to be the role of that statute
in policing administrative power.144 Yet, the role of such theories has been ignored,
even when the variations in how Chevron is applied are well recognized.145
In this Part, we want to show how the application of the Chevron doctrine re-
quires a consideration of a theory of expert public administration. We do so through
analyzing Chevron itself, the litigation that resulted in the Supreme Court decision of
FDA v. Brown and Williamson Corp.,146 and the Supreme Court’s recent case of City
of Arlington v. FCC.147
141 Frug, supra note 70, at 1282–83; Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 465;
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1669–70 (1975).
142 See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1–44 (3d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (discussing the difference between red light and green light the-
ories of public administration); see also JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher
Forsyth ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) (discussing a wide range of theories); MARTIN
LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 59–61 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (discussing
normativist and functionalist ideals).
143 FISHER, supra note 8, at 89–124.
144 Thus, for example, we see the relevance of the nondelegation doctrine in construing the
application of Chevron in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
This is more obvious in the decision of the D.C. Circuit in the same case. Am. Trucking Ass’ns
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1040, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and
the Rule of Law: Searching for ‘Intelligible Principles’ in the Administrative State, 3 ENVTL.
L. REV. 139, 141 (2001) (commenting on American Trucking). Likewise, whether an agency’s
interpretation of a statute is understood to be “reasonable” under step two will depend on a back-
ground theory about what a judge thinks is legitimate for an expert agency to do. Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
145 Sunstein, supra note 136, at 192 (comparing Justice Scalia’s and Justice Breyer’s
approach).
146 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
147 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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A. Chevron Itself
Justice Stevens in Chevron did not engage very much with the concept of expertise,
but his judgment does involve a careful analysis of the legislative background, and this
discussion is primarily embedded in an RI paradigm. This can be seen most obviously
in the fact that much of his judgment is focused on legislation and what it allows and
limits, rather than upon the nature of the administrative power it constitutes.148
This focus can be seen at both steps one and two of the two-step test. The first step
is focused on the legislative text,149 in which the point of consulting legislative his-
tory is to determine exactly what delegations and gaps the legislation created.150 The
“reasonableness” of the agency’s interpretation under step two is dependent upon the
extent to which the agency clings to the statutory framework and how it reconciles com-
peting political interests within that framework.151 Although Justice Stevens refers
to the need for the EPA to mostly consider “the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis,”152 the concept of policy is primarily understood as a conduit for delivering leg-
islative commands in light of further technical information and an understanding of the
different interests at play. Justice Stevens notes that “respondents are now waging in
a judicial forum a specific policy battle,”153 but that “[s]uch policy arguments are more
properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.”154 In other words, the
EPA is simply a tool for delivering congressional policy, and the wisdom of “its policy
choice” is less about the exercise of its owns discretion and more about it delivering
congressional policy in light of “a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests.”155 The need for the EPA’s expertise, therefore, arises because “Congress in-
tended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specific-
ity presented by these cases.”156
Moreover, the Court finds that it is appropriate to defer to the EPA’s reconciliation
of these interests because it is accountable to the President, who is in turn accountable
to the people.157 Expertise is defined narrowly and in the context of other forms of con-
trol. In thinking about how to defer to an administrative body, the constant focus is on
the legislative text and what it does and does not allow. There is no need to expand on
the concept of the expertise in this context because expertise has limited scope. In other
words, while Congress may find it necessary to delegate interpretive authority to an
148 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
149 Id. at 842–43.
150 Id. at 843.
151 Id. at 845, 847, 848.
152 Id. at 864.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 865.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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agency because of its expertise, expertise does not legitimate agency decisionmak-
ing. As Krotoszynski notes, “An implied delegation of lawmaking power, rather than
agency expertise, compelled the result.”158
This interpretation has been confirmed by Chevron’s biggest fan, Justice Scalia,
writing extrajudicially.159 He noted that deference to agency expertise was for the prac-
tical reason that such expertise meant an agency was more likely than a court to reach
the “correct result,” but that this was not a “valid theoretical justification” for deferring
to expertise.160 For him, Chevron meant “agency expertise” was “no longer relevant, or
no longer relevant in the same way.”161 This is because, as noted above, under the RI
paradigm of expert public administration, expertise is not a source of legitimacy.
What this has meant is that, despite the fact that Chevron had the appearance of a
straightforward “rule,” and despite its focus on the legislative text, its operation remains
dependent on a theory of expert public administration. This does not mean, however,
that the Chevron doctrine always needs to be interpreted in RI terms, and because there
are two such theories, not one, it should come as no surprise that the application of
Chevron results in different approaches and that it requires consideration of a variety
of issues.162 This is because, despite the focus on Chevron on text, its application is less
about text and far more about what is understood as the nature of administrative power.
As others have pointed out, the result is a trail of confusion left behind by the post-
Chevron cases.163
B. Interpreting the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
We could give many examples of where different judicial applications of Chevron
have been shaped by different theories of public administration.164 In light of space,
here we provide two further examples. The first is an extended case study of how the
doctrine was applied by the different levels of court in the litigation that ultimately led
to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.165
In 1996, the FDA promulgated a regulation that restricted the sale and distribution
of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children and adolescents.166 Since tobacco was
158 Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 739.
159 See Scalia, supra note 24.
160 Id. at 514.
161 Id. at 521.
162 Sunstein, supra note 136, at 190.
163 See, e.g., Lisa S. Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005).
164 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
165 529 U.S. 120 (2000). An earlier version of this analysis can be found in Elizabeth Fisher,
Food Safety Crises as Crises in Administrative Constitutionalism, 20 HEALTH MATRIX J. OF
LAW-MEDICINE 55 (2010).
166 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21
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not mentioned in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), whether the FDA had the
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco largely depended on whether, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, tobacco products fell within one of the classes of products that the FDA
was allowed to regulate.167
The FDCA states that the FDA can regulate “combination products,” which are
defined as products that “constitute a combination of a drug, device, or biologic
product.”168 A “drug” is defined under that Act as “articles (other than food) intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body.”169 Jurisdiction, as a result, rested, not
on the existence of a serious health hazard, but rather on the objective intent of the
manufacturers.170 In light of new evidence about the addictive effects of nicotine and
of manufacturers’ manipulation of tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes, the FDA felt that
it could establish that nicotine “affect[ed] the structure and function of the body” and
that manufacturers intended for that to occur.171 The FDCA required the FDA to pro-
vide “reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device,”172 once it was
regulated. While this would suggest the need to ban cigarettes, the FDA rejected this
outcome because it would lead to a black market. In light of the fact that eighty percent
of smokers started smoking under the age of eighteen, the FDA concluded that a regula-
tion banning the sale of tobacco cigarettes to minors was a more effective way of meet-
ing the requirement of “reasonable assurance.”173
Inevitably, the FDA’s decision to regulate was challenged, and while all judges at
all levels applied the Chevron doctrine, they did so in different ways.174 Stepping back,
it can be seen that the question of whether tobacco was a drug was part of a broader
debate about the power and nature of the FDA. As the majority in the Fourth Circuit
noted, “at its core, this case is about who has the power to make this type of major pol-
icy decision.”175 Whether a judge found that the FDA did or did not have jurisdiction
C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). The regulation banned sales of tobacco and smokeless
tobacco to minors and limited the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. Id.
167 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133–43.
168 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (2006).
169 § 321(g)(1)(C).
170 See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238–39 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussing the FDA’s arguments).
171 Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco is a Drug and These Products are Nicotine
Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determina-
tion, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,629–30 (Aug. 28, 1996).
172 E.g., § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i).
173 Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1021, 1047, 1050 (1998). It is also interesting to note that the Synar Amend-
ment (passed in 1992) makes it a precondition of federal grants to states that those states ban the
sale of tobacco products to minors and as such the rule already exists in all states. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300x-26(a)(1) (2006).
174 See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
175 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir. 1998).
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largely depended on their understanding about the role and nature of the FDA and its
relationship to Congress. In line with step one of the Chevron test, the point of depar-
ture was what authority Congress was assumed to have delegated to the FDA.176 In
other words, the textual question of step one could not be divorced from the institutional
question in step two.
That exercise of judicial construction did not occur in a vacuum. The answer to the
question what is and should be the role of the FDA should ideally be derived from a
legislative and institutional history. The FDCA and the FDA developed in a piecemeal
fashion, mainly in response to a variety of crises and legal developments.177 On the one
hand, the original logic behind the FDCA was a very limited RI one concerned with a
specific task—the proper labelling of foods.178 Later amendments, such as the Delaney
clause, were consistent with this, in that they gave very little discretion to the FDA.179
However, these amendments were interspersed with other legislative and administrative
reforms that granted greater discretion to the FDA, and in particular significant rule-
making power. The most dramatic metamorphosis occurred in the FDCA.180 The pic-
ture that emerges of the FDA is one of a body whose purpose and nature had evolved
with new Presidents, new Commissioners, and with legislative amendments.181 Thus,
just as with the EPA in Chevron, the expert administrative nature of the FDA had been
shaped over time and was open to question and debate.
In applying Chevron, judges were required to make a decision about the appropriate
model of expert public administration in this shifting context. Judge Osteen in the dis-
trict court embraced a DC approach. “He noted that the intentionally broad definition
of ‘drug,’ along with other amendments, was intended to ‘amplify and strengthen the
FDCA so as to ensure that the consumer was protected against “a multiplicity of abuses
not subject to the present law.”’”182 Likewise, he drew attention to the expertise and dis-
cretion of the FDA.183 For Judge Osteen, the issue was whether it was obvious that
Congress had not intended the FDA to regulate tobacco and, as he found there was no
176 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
177 See generally CHARLES O. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL
(1970); JAMES H. YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906
(1989); David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and
its Substantive Contents, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939).
178 See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911) (describing an interpretation of
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906).
179 See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing an
interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2006)).
180 See Ralph F. Fuchs, The Formulation and Review of Regulations Under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1939).
181 See generally Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitu-
tional and Statutory Structures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008).
182 Fisher, supra note 165, at 70 (quoting Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374
(M.D.N.C. 1997)).
183 Id.
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such intent (except in regard to the provisions that limited advertising and promotion),
he found that the FDA did have jurisdiction.184
The majority of the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court stat-
ing that it had proceeded on a “fundamental misconception” that “unavoidably skewed
the remainder of its analysis.”185 This sharp disagreement arose because the majority’s
approach was underpinned by the RI paradigm; they were construing the FDA as a
“servant” of Congress. The real question, according to the majority, was “whether
Congress intended to delegate” such jurisdiction to the FDA or, in other words, whether
the FDA had explicit authorization.186 They explained, “We begin with the basic propo-
sition that agency power is ‘not the power to make law. Rather, it is the “power to adopt
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”’”187
This was a fundamentally different question than that Judge Osteen asked and a very
RI one.188
The majority’s answer to the question that they had posed was that there had been
no explicit authorization. While tobacco fell literally under the definition of “drug,”
they found this conclusion was largely contrary to the statute for a number of reasons.189
First, they reasoned that if tobacco fell under the jurisdiction of the FDA, its failure to
ban tobacco products would amount to an abuse of discretion.190 Second, the FDA had
constantly stated they did not have the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco and Congress’s
action in the face of such statements was proof of its acquiescence in this judgment.191
Finally, and following on from this, Congress developed its own regulatory regime for
tobacco when it passed a number of statutes from 1965 onwards, which suggested it
did not give the task of tobacco regulation to the FDA.192 They also noted that any deci-
sion “involving countervailing national policy concerns” should be left to Congress.193
The majority was taking a hard RI line—the FDA as a rational-instrumental body had
little discretion to take initiative on this issue.
A strong dissent from Circuit Judge Hall reprised and strengthened the DC line of
analysis used by the lower court judge.194 Indeed, Hall’s opinion is an exemplar of DC
reasoning, particularly in the way in which it encompasses the different aspects of the
FDA’s power. The FDA, for him, was an institution that was set up to address a series
of problems. He stated, “The FDCA delegates to the FDA the duty of promulgating and
enforcing regulations aimed at protecting the nation’s citizens from misbranded and
184 Id.
185 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1998).
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976)).
188 See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
189 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 153 F.3d at 164.
190 Id. at 167.
191 Id. at 171.
192 Id. at 175–76.
193 Id. at 164.
194 See id. at 176–84 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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unsafe drugs and food.”195 He then went on to note the importance of understanding
the FDCA in broad purposive terms.196 This was particularly important regarding the
FDA’s change of position concerning their jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. For him, it
was unnecessary for Congress to have had a specific intent that the FDA had the power
to regulate tobacco products. Instead, he noted, “The operative congressional intent at
the outset was simply to confer broad discretionary powers on the FDA to regulate
‘drugs’ and ‘devices.’ The FDCA was written broadly enough to accommodate both
new products and evolving knowledge about existing ones, and it was written that way
on purpose.”197
Judge Hall characterized the FDA’s decision that tobacco regulation was within
its jurisdiction as growing out of the rulemaking process and the administrative record.
As such, the decision to regulate was the result of the active exercise of the agency’s
discretion.198 In other words, the FDA had acted legitimately in changing its mind be-
cause of the analysis and deliberation that took place in that rulemaking process. Hall
also responded to the majority’s argument that tobacco could not fall under the Act
because if it did it must be banned.199 He pointed out that this confused the issue of how
the FDA regulated with whether it regulated.200 This is a common feature of the RI
paradigm because, ideally, very little discretion should be left to the administrator.
The Supreme Court upheld the Fourth Circuit’s decision by a 5–4 margin.201 The
majority favored an RI approach, again by emphasizing the first step of the Chevron
test and characterizing it as one of whether Congress had explicitly authorized the FDA
to regulate tobacco products. Justice O’Connor stated for the majority:
[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to del-
egate a decision of such economic and political significance to
an agency in so cryptic a fashion. To find that the FDA has the
authority to regulate tobacco products, one must not only adopt
an extremely strained understanding of “safety” as it is used
throughout the Act—a concept central to the FDCA’s regulatory
scheme—but also ignore the plain implication of Congress’ subse-
quent tobacco-specific legislation.202
As in the court below, Justice O’Connor determined it was significant that the FDA
would need to ban tobacco if it fell under the regulatory scheme.203 The majority
195 Id. at 176.
196 Id. at 179.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 180.
199 Id. at 179.
200 Id.
201 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
202 Id. at 160.
203 Id. at 137.
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understood the objective of the FDCA to make sure that the products the FDA regulated
were “safe” and “effective,”204 which meant that the FDA’s failure to do this would con-
stitute a failure to follow congressional intent because Congress had granted no reme-
dial discretion under the Act.205 Likewise, the existence of tobacco specific legislation
not only ratified the FDA’s previous view, but also showed that Congress had devel-
oped a specific legislative response to the issue.206
For the dissent, Justice Breyer took a very DC approach by recognizing the consti-
tutive nature of the FDCA. He explained:
After studying the FDCA’s history, experts have written that the
statute “is a purposefully broad delegation of discretionary powers
by Congress,” . . . and that, in a sense, the FDCA “must be re-
garded as a constitution” that “establish[es] general principles” and
“permit[s] implementation within broad parameters” so that the
FDA can “implement these objectives through the most effective
and efficient controls that can be devised.”207
Indeed, for Justice Breyer, the FDA should largely be understood as a product of
the New Deal and that Congress’s enactment of the FDCA was premised on the belief
that regulatory bodies, such as the FDA, “need[ ] broad authority and would exercise
that authority wisely.”208 A narrow reading of the statute, therefore, contravened the
statute’s overall purpose of protecting health.209 The additional tobacco-specific legis-
lation did not oust the jurisdiction of the FDA to regulate tobacco products because the
FDA was an institution founded on DC principles.
C. City of Arlington v. FCC
Our final example is of more recent vintage and relates to a case of the Justices
channelling different paradigms of expert public administration. Five Justices held that
the second step of the Chevron doctrine was applicable to situations where an agency
was interpreting a statute so as to determine the scope of its authority, although Justice
Breyer’s concurrence differed as the methodology for determining when Chevron ap-
plies in this context.210 Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality opinion written by
Justice Scalia in order to renew their split over how Chevron should be applied, which
204 Id. at 133.
205 Id. at 136.
206 Id. at 157.
207 Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
208 Id.; see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993) (expressing the same view).
209 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 174.
210 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); see id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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we have seen before.211 The plurality opinion reveals Justice Scalia’s ongoing promo-
tion of an RI interpretation of the Chevron doctrine focused on text,212 while the con-
currence shows Justice Breyer’s commitment to a DC paradigm.213 A dissent authored
by Chief Justice Roberts strongly promotes a more multifaceted RI paradigm favored
by Justice Scalia.214
The issue in the case concerned the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which had
imposed limitations on the authority of states to restrict the location of wireless tele-
phone towers and antennas using their zoning authority.215 One such restriction was that
state or local governments must act on siting applications “within a reasonable period
of time after the request is duly filed.”216 The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) promulgated a rule that defined this time period.217 Although the FCC’s jurisdic-
tion to regulate was at issue, the case did not involve the sweeping discretion that was
at issue in the previous case. With that said, the power of the FCC has long given rise
to a debate about its nature and legitimacy.218
The plurality held that Chevron furnished the scope of review because this was an
ordinary case of statutory interpretation governed by Chevron.219 Justice Scalia rejected
the dissent’s contention that the case involved a jurisdiction issue to which a de novo
scope of review should be applied on the ground that jurisdictional issues could not
meaningfully be distinguished from nonjurisdictional issues.220 He also pointed out that
Chevron should be applied because it provides a “stable background rule against which
Congress can legislate,” and because “Congress knows how to speak in plain terms
when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge,
agency discretion.”221
Justice Scalia reverted to his usual approach to Chevron—when an ambiguity ex-
ists, it indicates a congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to an agency,
assuming that the agency has employed its law-making authority in resolving the
issue.222 He characterized efforts to remove “jurisdictional” issues from the scope of
Chevron as inviting every litigant to “play the ‘jurisdictional card’ in every case.”223
This would invite the federal judiciary to take the primary role in interpreting statutory
211 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
212 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1865–74.
213 Id. at 1875–77 (Breyer, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 1877 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 1866.
216 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
217 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1864.
218 Thus, the early formulations of “hard look review” were in relation to it. Greater Bos.
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–51 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
219 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874–75.
220 Id. at 1869 (describing any distinction between the two types of issues as “illusory”).
221 Id. at 1868.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1873.
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ambiguities, and therefore violate Congress’s decision to delegate such decision to
agencies: “The effect would be to transfer any number of interpretive decisions—
archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light
of competing policy interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to fed-
eral courts.”224
Justice Scalia offered two responses to the concerns of the dissent that applying
Chevron to so-called jurisdictional questions would lodge too much discretion in
agencies. First, anything but a bright-line test would invite unpredictability: “Thirteen
Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test would render the bind-
ing effect of agency rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of
Chevron. The excessive agency power that the dissent fears would be replaced by
chaos.”225 Second, a different test was unnecessary to control agency discretion be-
cause the rigorous application of step one was sufficient to protect against misuse
of discretion:
The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by es-
tablishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency deci-
sionmaking that is accorded no deference, but by . . . applying
rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.
Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency can-
not go beyond it; and where Congress has established an ambig-
uous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will
fairly allow.226
Scalia’s judgment is grounded in his understanding of the RI paradigm. His focus
is upon the textual commands set out in legislation and, because of that, he rejects any
distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues. For him, this distinction
is a “bogeyman,” “a Hound of the Baskervilles”227 because “[o]nce those labels are
sheared away, it becomes clear that the question in every case is, simply, whether the
statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of authority, or not.”228 This statement
indicates that his understanding is that an agency has no power except that granted by
the statute. To put it another way, the distinction between a jurisdictional and nonjuris-
dictional issue is a “false one” because an agency has no power in its own right.
This understanding reveals the limits of Justice Scalia’s vision of RI expert public
administration. Since Chevron operates only if there is ambiguity, a very odd under-
standing of the power of an agency results. A question of institutional legitimacy be-
comes fully dependent upon the answer to an exercise of textual analysis.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1874.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1872.
228 Id. at 1870–71.
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The concurrence picks up the problems with this result. Justice Breyer agreed that
any distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues was a “mirage.”229
However, he renewed his ongoing argument with Justice Scalia concerning whether
there should be a bright-line test for application of Chevron.230 For him, “[d]eciding just
what those statutory boundaries are, however, is not always an easy matter.”231 Instead,
“our cases make clear that other, sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion
prove relevant.”232 Thus, the issue of whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive
authority to an agency should be more nuanced than whether an ambiguity exists and
the agency issued a legally binding interpretation.
As in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Justice Breyer would require
an analysis of the whole of the statutory, institutional, and policy context so as to under-
stand the nature of the power constituted in the FCC.233 He proposed that a number
of different features are relevant to determining whether there should be deference:
(1) [T]he language of the Telecommunications Act grants the FCC
broad authority (including rulemaking authority) to administer the
Act; (2) the words are open-ended—i.e. “ambiguous”; (3) the pro-
vision concerns an interstitial administrative matter, in respect to
which the agency’s expertise could have an important role to
play; and (4) the matter, in context, is complex, likely making the
agency’s expertise useful in helping to answer the “reasonableness”
question that the statute poses.234
Here, as in Brown, the inquiry promotes a more DC understanding of expert public
administration than Justice Scalia’s bright-line test. Unlike a bright-line test, which
turns on whether the statutory words are ambiguous, Justice Breyer’s approach focuses
on whether it is likely that an agency’s expertise is relevant to the resolution of the am-
biguity. This is why in Mead he raises the possibility of applying Chevron deference
in circumstances where the agency’s interpretation is not legally binding.235
In contrast, the Chief Justice’s dissent is a very different response to the limits of
Scalia’s RI approach. He would have the judiciary review apply a de novo scope of
review to jurisdictional issues.236 For him, before Chevron is applied, a court must deter-
mine whether Congress has in fact given the agency the power to interpret ambiguous
229 Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring).
230 See supra note 207–09 and accompanying text.
231 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1876; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
234 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1876.
235 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
236 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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jurisdictional issues: “Agencies are creatures of Congress; ‘an agency literally has
no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.’ Whether
Congress has conferred such power is the ‘relevant question[ ] [sic] of law’ that must
be answered . . . .”237 This requires a specific determination of whether such a delega-
tion occurred concerning the specific statutory ambiguity at issue. The existence of an
ambiguity, which is resolved in a legally binding manner, is not sufficient to indicate
that the agency has the power to determine its own power. In other words, he diverges
from Scalia because he understands that Scalia’s approach will not deliver sufficient
outside-in accountability to ensure that RI public administration is kept under control.
The Chief Justice defends his approach because of the danger of agency discretion.
He begins with the observation, “A court should not defer to an agency until the court
decides on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference.”238 The Chief Justice then
warns: “One of the principal authors of the Constitution famously wrote that the ‘accu-
mulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . .
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’”239 Observing the combina-
tion of powers in modern agencies, he finds the “accumulation of these powers in the
same hands is not an occasional or isolated exception to the constitutional plan; it is
a central feature of modern American government.”240 Thus, not only did the Framers
not envision “today’s ‘vast and varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority adminis-
trative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political activities. ‘[T]he ad-
ministrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.’”241
Further, presidential oversight cannot possibly “keep federal officers accountable,”
allowing them “in practice a significant degree of independence.”242 Nor is normal judi-
cial review sufficient to hold agencies accountable. Citing Chevron, the Chief Justice
finds: “As for judicial oversight, agencies enjoy broad power to construe statutory
provisions over which they have been given interpretive authority.”243 Although “[i]t
would be a bit much to describe the result as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’” never-
theless “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot
be dismissed.”244
There is more, but the reader gets the idea. Given the risks posed by the administra-
tive state, only de novo judicial review will do when the issue is a jurisdictional issue.
Thus, the Court should “not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous pro-
vision unless Congress wants us to, and whether Congress wants us to is a question
237 Id. at 1880 (citations omitted).
238 Id. at 1877.
239 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
240 Id. at 1878.
241 Id. (citation omitted).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1879.
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that courts, not agencies, must decide. Simply put, that question is ‘beyond the
Chevron pale.’”245
It is hard to imagine a more enthusiastic endorsement of the RI paradigm and
outside-in accountability. A court must determine on a section-by-section basis whether
Congress has delegated it interpretive authority concerning provisions that define the
extent of its power. The idea that Congress creates agencies to use their expertise to fill
in the gaps of a statutory scheme is nowhere to be seen. All of this is necessary because
of the shortcoming of presidential and judicial oversight relying on Chevron. That ex-
pertise might furnish another source of legitimization is not contemplated and appar-
ently rejected.
CONCLUSION
Variations in applying the Chevron doctrine are due to different judges understand-
ing expert public administration in different ways. This insight becomes apparent once
it is understood that both an RI and DC paradigm have and continue to influence how
we think about the normative basis of the administrative state in the United States. We
see the existence of conflict between these paradigms as offering at least a partial expla-
nation for the legal uncertainty that is often identified by scholars as a feature of the
Chevron doctrine in practice.
Rather than defending that uncertainty, the goal of this Article has been to dig more
deeply into administrative doctrine in order to see the important, but often ignored role
that understandings of expert public administration play in the Chevron doctrine.
Chevron itself offers a very thin account of expertise, essentially ignoring the existence
of the DC paradigm. A more robust understanding of expertise is necessary to appreci-
ate the role that the DC and RI paradigms plays in administrative law. This understand-
ing highlights both that expertise is multifaceted and contextual. In Chevron, the court
recognizes only comparative expertise, but expertise normally operates in agencies as
both contributory and interactional expertise, both of which involve higher or more so-
phisticated levels of expertise than recognized in Chevron. Context matters because it
affects how expert knowledge, skills, and experience are gained and utilized. Three
institutional contexts are particularly relevant for administrative law: rational choice,
normative, and discursive institutionalism. The RI paradigm reflects only rational
choice institutionalism, while the DC paradigm reflects normative and discursive insti-
tutionalism. The DC paradigm, unlike the RI paradigm, acknowledges the potential of
institutional norms and a discursive process to overcome self-interest as the dominant
influence in an organization.
Our analysis above is not an argument for a “new” vision of administrative law, but
we do contend that scholars need to take a more careful look at what is actually before
them. The failure to do so has led administrative law scholarship into a corner in which
245 Id. at 1883 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)).
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expertise is understood to operate apart from any context. As a result, the discipline dis-
trusts expertise to an extent that is inconsistent with what we know about the reliability
of agency governance due to normative and discursive institutionalism. Moreover, the
failure to appreciate the potential of the DC paradigm, as a partner to the RI paradigm,
has led us to develop outside-in accountability in ways that have unnecessarily weak-
ened DC accountability. As we have said here and previously,246 the paradigms are
ideal types and what we should be seeking is the optimal combination of the two para-
digms, based on a realistic look at public administration.
We trust that this deeper look at Chevron and expertise honors Charles Koch and
his efforts to understand the nature of public administration. As Bill Jordan points out
in this symposium, “Charles’s scholarship reflects a faith in the ability to design com-
plex administrative systems to achieve our collective goals.”247 We hope that this paper,
in its own way, will advance that aspiration. At the heart of that enterprise is the need
to foster richer understanding of expertise. As Chevron demonstrates, we have a ways
to go.
246 Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 8, at 471.
247 William S. Jordan, III, Charles Koch, Jr.—The Casebook and the Scholarship, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 392 (2013).
